THE    FREEMAN    PAMPHLETS 


ASIA'S   AMERICAN    PROBLEM 

A  Diffident  Discussion  of  the 

Project  sometimes  called  the  New  International 

Chinese  Consortium,  and  of  certain  other 

combustible  matters  pertaining 

thereto. 


by 


Ceroid  Tanquary  Robinson 


NEW   YORK 

B.  W.  HUEBSCH,  Inc. 

MCMXXI 


25c. 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 

in  2007  with  funding  from 

IVIicrosoft  Corporation 


http://www.archive.org/details/asiasamericanproOOrobirich 


THE   FREEMAN    PAMPHLETS 


ASIA'S   AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

A  Diffident  Discussion  of  the 

Project  sometimes  called  the  New  International 

Chinese  Consortium,  and  of  certain  other 

combustible  matters  pertaining 

thereto, 

h 
Ceroid  Tanquary  Robinson 


NEW  YORK 

B.  W.  HUEBSCH,  Inc. 

MCMXXI 


^Ch'p'yri^iit,  ig2i,  by  B.  fV,  Huebsch,  Inc. 


For  permission  to  reprint  those  portions  of  this 
pamphlet  which  appeared  originally  in  the  pages  of  The 
Pacific  Review  and  The  Freeman,  the  author  makes  grate- 
ful acknowledgment  to  the  publishers  of  these  period- 
icals. 


4^i)12iS 


<r 


ASIA'S  AMERICAN  PROBLEM 

The  new  Far  Eastern  policy  of  the  United  States 
Government  has  created  in  Asia  an  "American  prob- 
lem" which  is  by  all  odds  the  most  important  factor  in 
Asiatic-American  relations. 

Now  as  a  matter  of  course,  this  is  not  the  sort  of 
statement  with  which  one  ordinarily  launches  out  upon 
a  casual  conversation.  It  resembles  rather  a  proposition 
to  be  proved.  And  yet  the  writer  has  neither  argument 
nor  proof  in  view,  but  intends  simply  to  talk  upon  this 
subject  for  a  while,  diffidently,  and  with  no  show  of  an 
assurance  he  does  not  feel,  in  the  hope  that  certain  topics 
which  have  gone  for  a  long  time  undiscussed  may  pres- 
ently receive  the  attention  they  seem  to  him  to  deserve. 

I.       CLOSING    THE    OPEN    DOOR. 

To  begin  with,  it  may  be  said  with  a  show  of  reason 
that  the  United  States  has  never  been  in  a  position  to 
profit  very  much  "by  the  maintenance  of  a  system  of 
spheres  of  influence  in  China.  This  much  may  be  gath- 
ered from  the  history  of  the  other  late  comers  in  the 
field — Germany  and  Japan.  These  powers,  like  the 
United  States,  had  open  to  them  the  choice  between  enter- 
ing tardily  into  the  old  game,  and  attempting  to  substitute 
new  rules  which  would  minimize  the  disadvantages  of 
their  late  arrival  on  the  scene.  Germany  chose  the  for- 
mer course,  and  followed  it  with  no  great  success.     If 

[3] 


]kp^n  liiid  bietter  luck,  it  was  largely  because  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War  placed  in  her  hands  a  group  of  concessions 
such  as  no  late  comer  in  China  could  have  acquired  peace- 
fully. When  the  United  States  adopted  the  alternative 
policy,  and  promulgated  the  doctrine  of  the  Open  Door, 
it  is  fair  to  assume  that  self-interest  was  at  least  as  effect- 
ive as  altruism  in  the  councils  of  our  Cabinet.  If  the 
Open  Door  policy  did  not  become  fully  effective,  it  was 
largely  because  Great  Britain  and  Russia,  the  chief  bene- 
ficiaries under  the  old  system,  were  just  as  much  opposed 
to  the  abandonment  of  this  system  as  they  were  to  the 
expansion  of  German  and  Japanese  holdings  under  it.  In 
other  words,  each  of  the  Powers  favored  the  system  that 
would  serve  it  best;  and  it  seemed  that,  at  this  stage  of 
the  game,  the  interests  of  the  United  States  were  coinci- 
dent with  those  of  China,  and  opposed  to  those  of  the 
great  concessioners. 

Things  continued  pretty  much  in  this  state  until  the 
outbreak  of  the  great  war,  when  the  bottling  up  of  Ger- 
many and  the  preoccupation  of  the  Allies  with  European 
affairs,  enabled  Japan  to  increase  her  influence  in  China 
very  rapidly  by  taking  over  the  German  holdings,  by 
enforcing  the  famous  "demands"  upon  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment, and  by  financing  the  warring  factions  which 
divided  the  country.  The  United  States  was  naturally 
regarded  as  the  enemy  of  this  kind  of  expansion;  and  it 
is  generally  thought  that  China  entered  the  war  in  the 
hope  that  this  move  would  enable  her  to  take  advantage 
of  the  supposedly  permanent  identity  of  Chinese  and 
American  interests. 

[4] 


with  the  publication  of  the  Lanslng-Ishli  Agreement, 
the  process  of  disillusioning  the  Chinese  was  begun.  Mr. 
Lansing  has  held  that  this  Agreement  was  in  essence  a 
re-affirmation  of  the  Hay  Doctrine;  but  most  unfortun- 
ately the  note  included  the  statement  that  "the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  recognizes  that  Japan  has 
special  interests  in  China,  and  particularly  in  that  part 
to  which  her  possessions  are  contiguous."  The  Japanese 
Government  has  interpreted  this  statement  as  an 
acknowledgment  of  Japan's  special  and  even  dominant 
position  In  China,  and  from  the  fact  that  the  agreement 
was  drawn  up  and  signed  entirely  without  the  knowledge 
or  consent  of  China — the  party  most  concerned — one 
may  infer  that  the  Japanese  interpretation  is  at  least  as 
plausible  as  that  of  Mr.  Lansing. 

At  Paris,  President  Wilson  might  perhaps  have 
cleared  up  the  uncertainties  created  by  this  unhallowed 
agreement,  but  the  use  he  made  of  the  opportunity 
seemed  to  confirm  the  broadest  claims  of  the  Japanese 
Imperialists;  for  here  again  a  matter  which  touched  the 
national  interests  of  China  was  disposed  of  in  accordance 
with  a  secret  agreement  to  which  China  was  not  a  party 
— not  this  time  a  note  from  Mr.  Lansing  to  Mr.  Ishii, 
but  a  secret  treaty  between  Great  Britain,  France  and 
Japan,  in  accordance  with  which  the  German  holdings  in 
China  were  to  pass  to  the  power  last  named.  Whatever 
may  have  been  the  reasons  for  this  disregard  of  the  rights 
of  China,  the  Chinese  might  with  reason  have  concluded 
that  their  own  Interests  and  those  of  America  were  no 
longer  exactly  Identical. 

[5] 


Yet  in  the  process  of  becoming  anti-Chinese,  Ameri- 
can policy  had  not  become  pro-Japanese,  and  hence  what 
was  lost  on  the  one  hand  was  hardly  made  up  by  gains 
on  the  other.  Not  only  had  the  Government  at  Wash- 
ington persistently  "misinterpreted;"  the  Lansing-Ishii 
Agreement,  but  in  the  matter  of  Shantung,  Mr.  Wilson 
had  yielded  most  ungraciously  and  only  after  long  debate. 
And  besides  this,  America  had  been  by  no  means  as 
friendly  as  the  other  powers  to  Japanese  advances  in 
Siberia.  Upon  the  protest  of  the  United  States,  the 
original  arrangement  for  intervention  by  Japanese  troops 
alone  had  been  abandoned,  and  a  new  agreement  drawn, 
which  provided  that  the  United  States,  as  well  as  several 
of  the  Allied  Powers,  should  participate  in  the  affair. 
During  the  period  of  American  operations  in  Siberia, 
the  Japanese  were  frequently  at  outs  with  the  American 
military,  and  with  the  officials  of  the  railway  administra- 
tion. When  Japanese  troops  occupied  Vladivostok  four 
days  after  the  departure  of  the  Americans,  it  looked  for 
a  while  as  though  the  Governments  of  the  two  countries 
had  come  to  an  understanding;  for  not  only  did  Wash- 
ington fail  to  protest  the  seizure,  but  a  dispatch  from 
the  capital  said  that  ^'Japan's  vital  interest,  from  the 
point  of  view  of  national  defense,  in  the  maintenance  of 
troops  in  Siberia  is  recognized  by  the  [American]  Gov- 
ernment." But  with  the  publication  of  the  American  pro- 
test against  the  Japanese  seizure  of  the  northern  half  of 
the  island  of  Saghalin,  the  two  Governments  were  seen 
to  be  again  at  odds  on  the  Siberian  question. 

[6] 


In  the  meantime  the  United  States  had  initiated 
another  project  which  was  destined  to  reveal  the  widest 
differences  of  opinion  between  Washington  and  Tokio. 
On  July  29,  19 1 8,  the  State  Department  announced 
America's  intention  to  take  a  hand  in  the  financial  rehabil- 
itation of  China,  in  a  statement  which  read  in  part  as 
follows : 

"China  declared  war  against  Germany  very  largely  because 
of  the  action  of  the  United  States.  Therefore  this  Government 
has  felt  a  special  interest  in  the  desire  of  China  so  to  equip  herself 
as  to  be  of  more  specific  assistance  in  the  war  against  the  Central 
Powers.  ...  An  agreement  has  been  reached  between  [certain 
bankers]  and  the  State  Department  which  has  the  following 
salient  features: 

"First — The  formation  of  a  group  of  American  bankers  to 
make  a  loan  or  loans  [to  China]  .   .   .   . 

"Fifth — Assurances  that,  if  the  terms  and  conditions  of  the 
loan  are  accepted  by  this  Government  and  by  the  Government  to 
which  the  loan  is  made,  .  .  .  the  American  Government  will  be 
willing  to  aid  in  every  way  possible  and  to  make  prompt  and 
vigorous  representations  and  to  take  every  possible  step  to  ensure 
the  execution  of  equitable  contracts  made  in  good  faith  by  Its 
citizens  in  foreign  lands.  .   .   . 

"Negotiations  are  now  passing  between  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  and  those  Governments  [of  Great  Britain,  Japan, 
and  France]  which  it  is  hoped  will  result  in  their  co-operation  and 
in  the  participation  by  the  bankers  of  those  countries  in  equal  parts 
of  any  loan  that  may  be  made." 

Great  Britain  and  France  readily  agreed  to  enter  the 

new  International  Chinese   Consortium  here   projected, 

but  Japan  held  aloof  until  the  summer  of   1920.     The 

reason  for  eagerness  on  the  one  hand,  and  reluctance  on 

the  other,  is  not  far  to  seek.     One  of  the  prime  objects 

of  the  Consortium  was  the  substitution  of  international 

[7] 


co-operation  In  the  financing  of  China,  for  the  further 
competitive  expansion  of  national  spheres  of  Influence. 
Because  of  their  numerous  troubles  In  Europe,  and  later 
In  newly  acquired  colonies  and  mandate  areas,  France 
and  England  were  unable,  for  the  time  being  at  least,  to 
push  their  claims  in  China  under  the  old  competitive  sys- 
tem. On  the  other  hand,  the  maintenance  of  this  sys- 
tem exactly  suited  the  needs  of  Japan,  since  she  alone 
was  In  a  position  to  extend  her  sphere  of  influence.  After 
two  years  of  negotiation,  Japan  finally  entered  the  Con- 
sortium, but  whether  with  or  without  reservations  Is  a 
matter  still  in  dispute.  On  the  one  hand  there  Is  the 
statement  of  the  most  important  promoter  of  the  pro- 
ject, Mr.  Thomas  Lamont  of  J.  P.  Morgan  and  Com- 
pany, that  "J^P^^  withdrew  her  reservations  In  toto,  and 
the  Japanese  Government  authorized  Its  banking  group 
to  enter  the  Consortium  without  qualification."  And 
to  balance  this — or  out-balance  it — there  is  this  equally 
specific  assertion  of  Premier  Hara  of  Japan : 

"As  to  the  reservations  made  on  our  side  in  regard  to  Man- 
churia and  Mongolia,  .  .  .  something  vital  to  us  as  a  nation  is 
involved  in  the  matter.  .  .  .  This  is  not  a  new  phase  of  the  Jap- 
anese policy  since  it  was  expressly  recognized  in  the  Ishii-Lansing 
Agreement.  .  .  .  America,  France  and  Great  Britain  now  fully 
appreciate  our  situation  and  are  in  perfect  accord  with  us." 

This  last  statement  is  of  a  later  date  than  the  official 
correspondence  on  the  subject  of  the  reservations  which 
the  State  Department  at  Washington  Issued  to  the  press 
on  29  March,  192 1.  But  whether  or  not  Japan  has  been 
granted  the  exceptional  right  to  expand  her  private 
sphere  of  influence  in  Manchuria  and  Mongolia,  It  is  fairly 

[8] 


certain  that  the  Consortium  sets  limits  of  some  kind  to  a 
process  of  Japanese  penetration  which  might  otherwise 
have  gone  on  Indefinitely;  and  It  is  equally  certain  that 
this  limit  was  fixed  at  the  instigation  of  the  United  States, 
and  after  long  opposition  by  the  Government  at  Tokio. 
Since  the  Consortium  does  not  affect  enterprises 
already  established,  and  since  the  protest  of  Washington 
against  China's  cancellation  of  Russian  privileges  seems 
to  indicate  a  great  solicitude  for  the  preservation  of  the 
existing  spheres,  the  Japanese  may  with  some  reason  con- 
clude that  iVmerica's  Far  Eastern  policy  Is  not  pro- 
Chinese,  or  anti-concessionary  in  any  general  sense,  but 
simply  anti-Japanese. 

II.     "in  the  interest  of  china." 

Is  It  then  to  be  supposed  that  with  the  launching  of 
the  Consortium,  the  flirtation  with  Japan  has  come  to 
an  end,  and  the  old  identity  of  American  and  Chinese 
Interests  has  been  re-established?  The  well-informed 
promoters  of  the  Consortium  have  said  again  and  again 
that  all  the  operations  of  this  new  body  will  be  con- 
ducted "in  the  interest  of  China,"  and  the  press  has 
played  this  tune  over  repeatedly,  with  all  possible  varia- 
tions. The  writer  is  obliged  to  admit  that  he  has  only  the 
haziest  notions  as  to  what  the  interests  of  China  may  be; 
notions  as  hazy,  perhaps,  as  those  of  most  of  the  para- 
graphers  who  have  broken  a  thousand  bottles  of  ink 
over  the  bow  of  the  Consortium,  and  have  sent  it  thus 
blithely  forth  upon  the  unknown  sea. 

[9] 


This  launching  is  likely  to  have  large  consequences,  of 
some  sort  or  other;  hence  it  may  be  worth  while  to  in- 
quire what  the  Chinese  think  these  consequences  will  be. 
It  is  very  likely  that  the  Chinese  themslves  do  not  know 
what  is  good  for  China,  but  there  can  be  no  harm  in  try- 
ing to  ascertain  their  judgment  as  to  where  their  interest 
lies.  Is  there  such  a  thing  In  China,  then,  as  public 
opinion?  Is  popular  sentiment  favorable  to  the  Consor- 
tium, or  opposed  to  it?  A  few  press-dispatches  and  some 
stray  items  of  first-hand  testimony  seem  to  indicate  that 
public  opinion  can  hardly  be  said  to  exist,  and  that  the 
sentiment  of  the  most  intelligent  group  in  the  country — 
the  student-class — is  divided  on  the  question. 

Beyond  this  very  limited  evidence,  one  can  not  go; 
but  this  hardly  relieves  Mr.  Lamont  and  his  friends 
of  the  obligation  to  do  what  they  can  to  prove  that 
a  decent  number  of  Chinese  approve  of  the  Consortium 
project.  If  the  Consortium  is  actually  being  formed 
in  the  interest  of  China,  and  if  there  Is  one  man  in 
China,  in  or  out  of  the  Government,  who  knows  what 
that  interest  is,  the  promoters  of  the  Consortium  would 
have  nothing  to  lose  and  everything  to  gain  by  taking 
that  man  into  their  confidence.  But  if  any  represen- 
tative of  the  Chinese  Government,  or  any  individual 
citizen  of  the  Republic  was  admitted  to  the  councils  of 
the  Consortium  during  the  formative  period,  the  fact 
has  escaped  public  notice;  and  now  that  the  final  agree- 
ment between  the  banking  groups  and  the  Governments 
of  the  United  States,  Great  Britain,  France  and  Japan 
has  been  formulated,  no  special  Importance  attaches  to 

[10] 


the  Intimation  that  Chinese  participants  may  hereafter 
be  admitted  to  the  Inner  circle. 

)  It  appears,  then,  that  China  has  had  as  little  part 
In  the  preparation  of  the  Consortium-agreement  as  the 
Germans  had  In  the  drafting  of  the  Peace  of  Versailles. 
China  may  accept  the  terms,  or  reject  them.  It  Is  said; 
but  the  choice  Is  hardly  more  real  than  It  was  In  the 
case  of  Germany.  To  be  sure,  Sir  Charles  Addis,  who 
represented  the  British  group  at  the  recent  New  York 
conferences,  has  said  that  ''without  the  assent  and  good- 
will of  China  the  Consortium  Is  not  only  powerless  to 
act,  but  has  no  desire  to  act."  And  Mr.  Thomas  La- 
mont,  representing  the  American  group,  has  stated  that 
no  attempt  will  be  made  to  Influence  China  unduly  to 
take  loans,  and  that  assistance  will  be  provided  only  If 
China  desires  it. 

All  this  has  the  show  of  reason;  but  no  more  than 
the  show  of  It.  Report  has  It  that  the  monthly  deficit 
of  the  Chinese  Government  comes  to  something  like 
$6,000,000;  the  amount  of  fluid  capital  within  the  coun- 
try is  limited,  and  it  is  admitted  on  all  hands  that  the 
country  Is  practically  bankrupt.  China  must  borrow;  and 
the  nations  from  which  she  must  borrow,  now  including 
Belgium,  have  just  reached  an  agreement  to  handle 
through  the  Consortium  all  the  loans  to  China  which  are 
"of  a  character  sufficiently  important  to  warrant  a  public 
Issue."  With  all  due  regard  to  the  possibility  that 
small  domestic  or  foreign  loans  may  still  be  negotiated 
Independently,  one  must  still  conclude  that  as  between 
the    acceptance   and   the   rejection   of   the    Consortlum- 

[11]  • 


conditions,    China   can  have,   in  the  long  run,   no   real 
choice. 

But  perhaps  this  is  not  such  a  bad  thing  for  China 
after  all.  If  the  country  prospers  under  the  treatment 
she  is  to  receive,  it  may  some  day  be  forgotten  that 
no  Chin4*»afl  was  called  in  consultation  when  the  pre- 
scription was  prepared.  And  certainly  China  is  no 
Paradise  under  the  present  system  of  disunity,  peri- 
odic revolution,  corrupt  finance,  and  competitive  con- 
cession-hunting. The  pooling  of  foreign  interests  will 
undoubtedly  result  in  the  elimination  of  one  of  the 
chief  sources  of  trouble;  and  in  the  end,  the  Consor- 
tium-group may  actually  achieve  the  political  and  eco- 
nomic rehabilitation  of  the  country.  Indeed,  China  must 
be  made  Into  a  going  concern,  politically  and  economic- 
ally, If  the  bonds  underwritten  by  the  financiers  are  to  be 
worth  the  paper  they  are  printed  on. 

However,  this  task  of  reconstruction  can  not  be 
carried  out  solely  by  the  advancing  of  funds.  Paul  S. 
Reinsch,  former  United  States  Minister  to  China,  gives 
a  hint  of  the  manner  In  which  the  rehabilitation  of 
China  is  to  be  accomplished  when  he  says : 

"The  foreign  lenders  have  the  right  to  demand  security  for 
their  investment.  .  .  .  The  best  security  from  every  point  of  view 
is  found  in  improved  methods  of  revenue  and  general  administra- 
tion." 

One  of  the  latest  newspaper  reports  on  the  subject 

says,  more  specifically: 

"Some  of  the  conditions  under  which  an  Initial  loan  may  be 
made,  it  is  understood,  are: 

"Disbandment  of  the  standing  armies; 

[12] 


"Reunion  of  the  North  and  South; 

"Assignment  of  a  part  of  the  loan  to  the  southern  provinces; 

"Supervision  by  representatives  oi  the  consortium  of  the 
expenditure  of  the  loan; 

"Pledging  of  the  surplus  of  the  salt  gabelle,  of  customs  duties 
and  other  income,  to  guarantee  repayment  of  the  loan." 

The  last  two  conditions  have  been  mentioned  repeat- 
edly in  other  reports,  and  it  may  be  concluded  that 
they  are  fairly  well  settled  upon.  When  the  security 
of  the  new  loans  depends  of  necessity  upon  the  peace 
and  prosperity  of  China,  It  is  only  natural  that  the 
Powers  should  contemplate  a  sort  of  collective  guard- 
ianship, with  a  considerable  participation  In  the  internal 
affairs  of  the  Republic.  A  cable  from  Pekln  even  goes 
so  far  as  to  say  that  the  situation  requires 
"not  only  foreign  auditing  after  expenditure  of  the  loan-proceeds, 
but  foreign  approval  before  expenditure  and  foreign  supervision 
during  expenditure.  And  Inasmuch  as  there  must  be  protec- 
tion of  the  security  for  the  loans,  there  must  be  supervision  over 
the  collection  and  disbursement  of  the  ordinary  revenues  of  the 
Government.  And  this  means  an  International  financial  trustee- 
ship." 

A  recently  published  memorandum,  bearing  the  date 
of  8  October,  191 8,  reveals  the  complacency  with  which 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  would  look  upon 
the  establishment  of  such  a  trusteeship.  In  a  previous 
communication,  it  had  been  stated  that  the  Government 
"would  be  opposed  to  any  terms  or  conditions  of  a  loan 
which  sought  to  impair  the  political  control  of  China,  or 
lessened  the  sovereign  rights  of  that  Republic."  The 
memorandum  of  8  October  says  that  this  reservation 
"had  reference  only  to  the  future  activities  of  the  American  Group, 
and  was  not  intended  to  call  In  question  the  propriety  of  any  speci- 

[13] 


fie  arrangement  in  operation  between  the  former  Consortium  and 
the  Chinese  Government,  or  between  any  other  Government  and 
the  Chinese.  It  can  be  definitely  stated  that  the  United  States 
Government  did  not  mean  to  imply  that  foreign  control  of  the 
collection  of  revenues  or  other  specific  security  pledged  by  mutual 
consent  would  necessarily  be  objectionable,  nor  would  the  appoint- 
ment under  the  terms  of  some  specific  loan  of  a  foreign  adviser, 
...  as,  for  instance,  to  supervise  the  introduction  of  Currency 
Reform." 

Now,  whatever  may  be  said  for  this  method  of 
procedure  as  a  temporary  expedient,  hardly  anybody 
will  argue  that  a  perpetual  protectorate  can  serve  the 
interest  of  China.  Consequently  there  has  been  always 
in  the  background  of  the  current  discussion  of  the  Con- 
sortium a  vague  assumption  that  some  day,  when  the 
affairs  of  the  Republic  are  nicely  straightened  out,  the 
Powers  will  retire,  and  leave  China  to  enjoy  in  full 
sovereignty  the  fruits  the  Consortium  has  borne.  This 
assumption  may  be  well  grounded  in  an  inherent  faith 
in  the  goodness  of  humanity  and  the  righteousness  of 
nations;  but  what  other  reason  anyone  can  have  for 
accepting  it,  it  is  hard  to  see.  Just  in  proportion  as 
the  Consortium-groups  succeed  in  rehabilitating  China, 
in  that  proportion  the  value  of  the  country  as  a  field 
for  investment  will  increase.  On  the  whole,  then,  it 
seems  that  the  likelihood  of  a  peaceful  withdrawal  of 
the  Powers  must  vary  inversely  with  the  prosperity  of 
the  country. 

Of  course  it  may  be  argued  that  even  under  these 
conditions,  material  prosperity  is  not  bought  at  too  high 
a  price.     Let  the  Powers  but  develop  the  resources  of 

[14] 


China  sufficiently,  and  the  country  will  be  strong  enough 
to  rid  herself  of  her  guardians,  if  they  will  not  go  of 
themselves.  In  the  chain  of  logic  that  leads  to  this 
conclusion,  there  are  weak  links  in  plenty,  and  the  con- 
clusion itself  is  not  likely  to  be  put  forward  by  the 
friends  of  the  Consortium  as  an  argument  in  favour  of 
their  enterprise.  Nevertheless,  the  development  of 
China's  material  strength  seems  to  offer  the  only  pos- 
sibility of  escape  from  the  Consortium,  once  it  is  estab- 
lished; and  this  means  that  the  period  of  tutelage  may 
be  extended  indefinitely. 

To  say  this  Is  to  say  that  In  the  Chinese  themselves 
is  the  only  hope  of  China.  To  believe  anything  else 
is  to  cling  to  a  child-like  faith  which  is  hardly  justified 
by  the  history  of  Western  imperialism  in  the  Orient. 
Any  effort  upon  the  part  of  the  Chinese  themselves  to 
keep  alive  such  a  faith  in  foreign  beneficence,  is  the 
worst  sort  of  nonsense.  The  wants  and  needs  of  the  Chi- 
nese people  are  their  own  particular  business;  any  other 
belief  promises  to  keep  the  Chinese  everlastingly  where 
the  Powers  want  them — In  the  class  of  international 
dependents,  defectives,  and  delinquents. 

III.      WILL  CHINA  MUDDLE  THROUGH? 

If  China  is  compelled  to  accept  the  kind  offices  of 
the  Consortium,  it  will  be  the  chief  concern  of  the  inter- 
national mortgagees  to  hasten  the  revolutionary  econo- 
mic changes  which  are  already  under  way  in  the  Celestial 
Republic.     Nowadays,  of  course,  the  Industrial  Revolu- 

[15] 


tion  is  commonly  thought  of  as  a  finished  episode  of  his- 
tory, ready  to  be  analysed,  evaluated,  and  shelved  along 
with  such  antiquities  as  the  Crusaders,  the  Renaissance 
and  the  Reformation.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  may  be 
said  with  at  least  a  show  of  reason  that  the  Industrial 
Revolution  is  still  in  full  swing  in  Western  Europe  and 
in  the  United  States;  and  certainly  it  is  true  that  the 
thousand  million  inhabitants  of  the  continent  of  Asia  have 
as  yet  been  hardly  touched  by  its  influence.  If  this 
revolution  is  destined  to  produce  in  China  and  elsewhere 
in  Asia  a  series  of  changes  as  fundamental  as  those  which 
have  already  occurred  in  Europe,  then  as  a  world-move- 
ment it  has  no  more  than  begun,  and  the  discussion  of 
its  most  important  effects  is  still  the  business  of  the 
prophet  rather  than  the  historian. 

In  the  material  conditions  of  Asia  there  is  the  prom- 
ise of  early  developments  of  the  most  profound  signifi- 
cance. Of  the  five  factors  named  by  Mr.  J.  A.  Hobson 
as  necessary  for  the  rise  of  the  system  of  production 
which  has  characterized  the  Industrial  Revolution,  three 
are  already  present  in  varying  measure  in  the  East,  the 
fourth  is  being  supplied  by  Europeans,  and  the  fifth 
factor  alone  remains  an  uncertain  quantity.  The  con- 
ditions already  fulfilled  in  Asia  are :  first,  the  produc- 
tion of  wealth  not  required  to  satisfy  the  current  wants 
of  its  owners;  second,  the  existence  of  a  labour-surplus, 
here  more  abundant  than  that  created  in  England  by 
the  Enclosures;  and  third,  the  presence  of  large  and 
accessible  markets.  The  fourth  factor  includes  all  those 
mechanical  devices  and  industrial  processes  which  have 

[16] 


been  so  highly  developed  In  the  West,  and  the  fifth  is 
an  Imponderable  which  Mr.  Hobson  has  called  *'the 
capitalistic  spirit." 

Since  Asia  has  long  possessed  by  inheritance  the 
three  comparatively  static  prerequisites  for  the  Revolu- 
tion— wealth,  labour  and  markets — and  is  now  accept- 
ing, under  pressure  of  economic  necessity,  the  first  of 
the  new  dynamic  factors,  it  may  be  said  that  all  the  ma- 
terial conditions  for  the  Revolution  are  already  present. 
Thus,  the  Orient  Is  being  swept  Into  a  movement,  the 
character  and  results  of  which  seem  to  depend  almost 
entirely  upon  the  quality  of  Asia's  non-material  impor- 
tations from  Europe,  and  upon  the  extent  to  which 
Asiatic  and  European  influences  operate  to  modify  in 
Asia  the  spirit  which  tolerated  all  the  horrors  of  the 
earlier  stages  of  the  Industrial  Revolution  in  the  West. 

Although  it  is  true  that  economic  changes  may  re- 
store the  balance  which  has  held  against  Asia  since  the 
Middle  Ages,  and  thus  set  once  more  in  motion  towards 
Europe  *'the  rising  tide  of  colour,"  such  a  result  would  be, 
after  all,  a  by-product.  The  question  of  primary  and 
planetary  Importance  Is  this:  what  will  be  the  direct 
effect  of  the  new  material  civilization  upon  the  life  of 
the  Asiatics  themselves?  For  the  future  history  of  the 
world  as  a  whole.  It  Is  perhaps  Impossible  to  frame  at 
this  time  a  question  more  profoundly  significant  than 
this. 

In  the  attitude  of  the  four  representative  peoples 
of  Asia  towards  the  material  and  non-material  achieve- 
ments of  the  West  one  may  discover  some  hint  as  to 

[17] 


the  use  that  the  Orientals  will  ultimately  make  of  the 
tremendous  new  forces  that  are  now  in  process  of  gen- 
eration. The  following  remarks  on  this  subject  are  put 
forth  In  the  full  consciousness  that  it  is  Impossible  for 
any  casual  commentator  to  speak  with  authority  in  such 
broad  terms  and  upon  such  uncertain  Issues  as  these; 
and  yet  it  does  seem  that  in  common  report  and  the 
common  understanding  of  Asiatic  affairs,  evidence  of 
certain  broadly  significant  tendencies  may  be  discovered. 

It  Is  extremely  unsafe  to  hazard  any  generalization 
which  refers  to  the  people  of  India  as  one  people,  and 
yet  It  may  be  said  with  tolerable  certainty  that  India  has 
submitted  to,  rather  than  desired,  the  importation  of 
new  machines  and  new  methods  of  production,  while  the 
articulate  elements  of  her  population  have  shown  them- 
selves somewhat  Interested  In  Western  ideas  of  political 
democracy,  though  comparatively  indifferent  to  the  re- 
mainder of  European  thought.  If  this  tendency  holds, 
the  natural  result  will  be  a  long  period  of  political  ex- 
perimentation, first  under  British  sovereignty  and  then 
perhaps  by  the  natives,  during  which  time  India  will 
enjoy  more  than  a  full  measure  of  all  the  evils  that 
England  suffered  early  In  the  nineteenth  century. 

Of  dismembered  Turkey,  one  can  say  nothing  definite, 
although  the  situation  was  fairly  clear  in  ante-bellum 
days.  At  that  time,  the  dominant  group  was  extremely 
hospitable  to  European  materialism,  and  more  specific- 
ally to  the  industrial  efficiency  and  the  political  centra- 
lization of  Germany.  With  Japan,  the  case  was,  and 
Is,  much  the  same,  except  that  here  the  initiative  has 

[18] 


come  definitely  from  the  native  governing  class,  who 
have  borrowed  Indiscriminately  such  elements  of  Euro- 
pean civilization  as  promised  to  serve  their  interests. 
In  the  case  of  Japan,  more  clearly  than  in  that  of  Turkey, 
the  tendency  has  been  to  import  the  mechanism  and  the 
materialism  of  the  Industrial  Revolution,  with  none  of 
the  correctives  that  bitter  experience  has  suggested  to 
the  Europeans  of  the  present  generation.  Thus  It  Is 
perfectly  natural  that  the  Japanese  people  should  be 
undergoing  at  the  present  time  a  plague  of  progress  and 
poverty,  very  much  like  that  which  once  devastated  Lan- 
cashire and  Yorkshire.  Nor  is  there  any  substantial 
relief  in  prospect,  for  in  Japan  more  even  than  in  Ger- 
many, the  Industrial  Revolution  is  the  work  of  the  Gov- 
ernment, and  the  remedies  most  likely  to  be  tried,  when 
conditions  become  altogether  unendurable,  are  obviously 
those  of  State-socialism. 

With  China  the  case  is  hardly  so  clear.  Here  the 
new  machines  and  the  new  methods  of  the  West  have 
not  hitherto  had  a  single  official  promoter,  like  the  British 
Government  in  India  or  the  Autocracy  in  Japan,  although 
the  Consortium  now  promises  a  somewhat  similar  spon- 
sorship; Indifference  to  politics  is  said  to  be  once  more 
rather  general,  as  a  consequence  of  the  disappointing 
experiences  of  the  revolt  against  the  Manchus;  and  upon 
the  whole  the  country  seems  to  exhibit  still  that  easy  and 
natural  anarchism  in  economic  and  political  affairs  which 
Is  considered  to  have  been  always  somewhat  charac- 
teristic of  the  Chinese. 

[19] 


Under  such  circumstances,  partly  of  its  own  crea- 
tion, it  is  only  natural  that  the  Chinese  student-move- 
ment should  have  turned  from  its  early  political  Inter- 
ests to  miscellaneous  adventures  of  the  intellect.  In 
19 19  there  were  only  one  or  two  journals  published  in 
the  Chinese  vernacular,  while  to-day  there  are  more  than 
three  hundred.  This  change  does  not  involve  the  aban- 
donment of  a  classic  international  language,  such  as  Latin 
once  was  In  Europe;  It  means  the  substitution  of  one 
Chinese  language  understood  by  millions,  for  another 
that  is  read  by  a  comparatively  small  class.  The  stu- 
dents have  interested  themselves  also  in  the  importation 
of  a  variety  of  European  ideas  which  have  as  little  as 
possible  to  do  with  the  working  out  of  the  Industrial 
Revolution  according  to  the  old  and  ruinous  plan.  The 
journals  of  the  student-movement  teem  with  articles  on 
socialism,  communism  and  anarchism,  as  well  as  on  more 
erudite  subjects,  and  indeed  the  students  seem  to  have 
centered  their  attention  upon  those  particular  phases  of 
Western  life  and  thought  that  have  been  most  studiously 
avoided  by  the  Mikado's  official  Importers. 

If  the  students  of  China  are  only  left  free  to  con- 
centrate their  attention  for  a  while  upon  these  non-ma- 
terial offerings  of  Europe,  they  will  discover  some  evi- 
dence of  discontent  with  the  use  that  has  been  made  of 
the  vast  powers  generated  there  by  the  Industrial  Revo- 
lution, and  an  occasional  expression  of  doubt  concerning 
the  ability  of  the  political  State  to  control  these  powers 
for  the  public  good.  They  will  know  in  advance,  as 
Europe  could  not  have  known,  that  an  increase  in  pro- 

[20] 


ductivlty  Is  not  always  accompanied  by  an  Increase  in 
well-being,  but  sometimes  by  its  exact  opposite.  When 
they  have  meditated  upon  these  things,  and  have  consid- 
ered also  the  demonstration  of  the  Russian  Marxians 
themselves  that  nothing  is  inevitable,  not  even  the  course 
of  Marxian  evolution  and  revolution,  they  may  be 
tempted  to  seek  earnestly  for  economic  solutions  of  the 
economic  problems  that  rest  with  steadily  Increasing 
weight  upon  the  shoulders  of  the  Chinese  people. 

IV.     America's  course  of  empire. 

If  the  serviceability  of  the  Consortium  to  China  Is 
at  least  questionable;  If  the  active  and  increasing  par- 
ticipation of  this  country  in  Asiatic  affairs  has  gained  for 
America  the  Ill-will  of  Japan;  It  should  at  least  be  dem- 
onstrable that  the  Far  Eastern  policy  of  the  United  States 
Is  "pro-American" — that  Is,  It  should  be  so.  If  this  policy 
Is  to  be  held  worthy  of  support  on  any  grounds. 

Some  effort  has  already  been  made  to  show  that.  In 
so  far  as  It  was  effective  at  all,  the  Open  Door  policy  did 
actually  serve  the  interest  of  the  United  States,  since  It 
helped  to  open  Chinese  markets  to  American  goods,  with- 
out at  the  same  time  Involving  the  country  In  political 
entanglements.  On  the  other  hand,  It  would  be  difficult 
to  demonstrate  that  the  Lansing-Ishii  agreement  could 
possibly  have  brought  good  results  of  any  sort  to 
America.  The  surrender  of  Shantung  is  so  involved  with 
the  other  doings  of  the  Peace  Conference  that  Its  effect 
— if  It  had  any  effect,  other  than  the  evil  It  worked  to 

[21] 


China — Is  hardly  capable  of  appraisal.  Likewise  It  is 
still  to  be  proved  that  any  good  has  come  of  American 
meddling  In  Siberia;  the  Japanese  went  In  first  with  the 
consent  of  the  American  State  Department,  and  the  pros- 
pect Is  that  they  will  stay,  In  spite  of  American  protests, 
until  the  Russians  are  able  to  put  them  out. 

But  to-day  the  Consortium  is  the  most  important  fac- 
tor In  the  Far  Eastern  situation,  and  by  its  results  the 
Asiatic  policy  of  the  United  States  must  be  judged.  All 
discussion  of  this  project  has  hitherto  been  conducted 
upon  such  a  high  moral  plane,  and  the  interests  of  China 
have  been  so  long  and  so  carefully  considered,  that  one 
may  hardly  turn  now  without  an  apology  to  a  minor 
phase  of  this  laboured  subject — the  interests  of  America. 
If  such  a  shift  of  emphasis  gives  evidence  of  a  selfishness 
altogether  out  of  keeping  with  the  spirit  of  this  mission- 
ary enterprise,  any  attempt  to  open  up  the  matter  still 
further  by  drawing  distinctions  between  the  Interests  of 
the  Individual  promoters  of  the  Consortium,  and  those 
of  the  balance  of  the  American  citizenry,  must  be  re- 
garded as  even  more  unseemly.  To  say  that  these  pro- 
moters have  put  American  interests  above  the  interests 
of  China,  is  to  attribute  to  them  a  type  of  selfishness 
most  easily  condoned.  But  to  assert  that  America  can 
not  profit  by  the  high  position  here  given  her,  is  to  in- 
timate that  her  gentlemen-adventurers  are  serving  no 
interests  but  their  own;  and  this  Is  indeed  to  assault  the 
last  trenches  of  their  altruism. 

Next  to  China  and  Japan,  America  is  the  nation  most 
concerned    in    the    Consortium-negotiations,    but    unlike 

[22] 


China,  America  has  been  a  party  to  these  negotiations 
from  the  beginning.  Not  only  did  the  American  Gov- 
ernment take  the  initiative  In  this  affair,  but  It  appears 
likely  that  most  of  the  financial  operations  under  the  Con- 
sortium will  be  conducted  by  American  financiers.  Such 
a  contingency  is  provided  for  In  certain  paragraphs  of  the 
agreement,  officially  summarized  as  follows: 

^'Articles  3  and  4  provide  for  complete  equality  among  the 
groups  in  all  business  undertaken  by  the  Consortium,  and  reserve 
freedom  to  each  group  to  decline  to  participate  in  any  business 
which  it  does  not  desire  to  undertake. 

"Article  5  provides  that,  so  far  as  possible,  the  parties  to  any 
operation  shall  not  be  jointly  liable,  each  of  the  groups  undertaking 
to  liquidate  its  own  engagements. 

"Under  Articles  6  and  7,  any  group  not  desiring  to  make  an 
Issue  In  Its  own  market  may  request  the  other  groups  to  include 
its  share  in  their  own  issue." 

The  extent  to  which  the  American  banking-groups 
may  be  expected  to  take  advantage  of  these  conditions 
Is  indicated  In  the  following  statement  by  Mr.  Thomas 
Lamont  of  J.  P.  Morgan  and  Company,  head  of  the 
American  group,  and  the  most  prominent  figure  in  the 
public  transactions  of  the  Consortium: 

"Owing  to  the  war  [says  Mr.  Lamont],  the  British  and  French 
markets  may  be  unable  for  some  years  to  come  to  purchase  any 
large  amount  of  foreign  securities,  either  of  China  or  any  other 
nation.  [Mr.  Lamont  might  also  have  referred  here  to  the  panic 
in  Japan,  and  the  consequent  Inability  of  that  country  to  make 
heavy  loans  abroad.]  The  American  group,  therefore,  has  by  force 
of  circumstances  jumped  from  an  Inconspicuous  position  In  the 
old  consortium  to  one  of  prime  Importance  In  the  new. 

"In  this,  America,  as  represented  by  the  group,  should  be 
equipped  to  play  a  very  Important  part.     If  so  equipped,  she  will 

[23] 


be  able  to  envisage  the  situation  so  as  to  lay  out,  with  her  exper- 
ienced partners,  Great  Britain,  France  and  Japan,  a  sound  and 
comprehensive  plan  for  the  economic  and  financial  development  of 
China  .  .  .  Through  her  representatives  at  Peking,  she  will  be  able 
sympathetically  to  wield  influence  upon  the  present  confused 
elements." 

From  the  language  of  this  statement,  one  gathers  that 
Mr.  Lamont  does  not  take  very  seriously  the  provision 
in  the  official  agreement  for  "complete  equality  among 
the  groups  in  all  business  undertaken  by  the  Consortium." 
When  read  in  connection  with  the  other  provisions  al- 
ready quoted,  this  clause  seems  to  provide  only  for  an 
equality  of  opportunity  for  investment;  not  a  very  real 
equality,  when  only  one  of  the  Powers  has  funds  to  spare; 
and  the  provision  that  each  group  shall  undertake  to 
liquidate  its  own  engagements  would  seem  to  indicate  that 
control  over  China's  assets,  and  consequently  the  power 
exercised  in  that  country,  is  to  be  proportional  to  in- 
vestment. 

The  "representatives"  of  whom  Mr.  Lamont  expects 
such  novel  achievements  can  hardly  be  the  members  of 
our  diplomatic  corps,  who  have  been  carrying  on  their 
obscure  affairs  in  China  these  many  years.  The  classic- 
fication  seems  to  apply  more  accurately  to  the  ambassa- 
dors of  the  American  banking-group,  of  whom  the  first 
is  Mr.  Frederick  W.  Stevens,  formerly  of  J.  P.  Morgan 
and  Company. 

In  the  paragraphs  just  quoted,  no  specific  informa- 
tion is  furnished  as  to  what  Mr.  Stevens's  duties  will 
be,  although  one  may  infer  that  his  attention  will  not 
be  confined  to  matters  of  a  non-political  and  routine  na- 

[24] 


ture.  As  the  representative  of  the  principal  creditors 
of  China,  Mr.  Stevens  will  probably  be  held  responsible 
for  such  a  political  and  financial  rehabilitation  of  the 
country  as  is  necessary  to  secure  the  safety  of  the  Ameri- 
can loans.  His  duties  may  turn  out  to  be  somewhat  like 
those  of  a  British  Resident  in  India,  with  this  minor  dis- 
tinction, that  the  Britisher  is  responsible  to  his  Home 
Government,  while  Mr.  Stevens  is  responsible  to  a  group^ 
of  private  individuals  who  happen  to  have  money  to 
lend. 

In  sum,  then,  and  in  its  simplest  elements,  the  situa- 
tion is  substantially  this:  Against  China's  great  need, 
there  is  opposed  the  Consortium's  great  power.  The 
Chinese  Government  must  have  funds,  but  it  can  not 
furnish  the  ordinary  security  for  repayment.  The  chief 
lenders,  being  in  combination,  are  in  a  position  to  de- 
mand the  most  substantial  guarantees.  Only  by  a  greater 
or  less  participation  of  the  lenders  in  the  soverign  con- 
trol of  China,  can  these  guarantees  be  made  really  ef- 
fective. The  American  banking-group  is  the  only  lender 
in  a  position  to  make  large  advances,  and  in  the  natural 
course  of  events  this  group  will  control  the  major  share 
of  this  peculiar  security.  In  the  handling  of  this  security 
— that  is,  in  the  exercise  of  a  certain  measure  of  control 
over  the  affairs  of  China — the  American  financiers  will 
have  the  full  support  of  their  Government;  for  proof  of 
this  last  statement,  doubting  readers  are  referred  once 
more  to  the  note  which  opened  the  Consortium-negotia- 
tions, wherein  it  was  stated  that  ''the  American  Govern- 
ment will  be  willing     ,     .     ,     to  take  every  possible  step 

[25] 


to  insure  the  execution  of  equitable  contracts  made  in 
good  faith  by  its  citizens  in  foreign  lands."  In  this  con- 
nection, it  should  also  be  remembered  that  the  Harding 
Administration  has  now  underwritten  the  scheme  which 
the  Wilson  Administration  formulated  with  so  much  care. 
If  the  American  holders  of  Mexican  bonds  had  made 
their  investments  with  the  backing  of  such  a  promise 
as  this;  if  they  had  banded  themselves  together,  under 
the  sanction  of  the  State  Department,  for  the  purpose 
of  maintaining  at  Mexico  City  a  Resident  whose  busi- 
ness it  was  to  "co-operate"  with  the  Mexican  authorities 
in  keeping  the  country  in  a  prosperous  condition  and 
ready  to  meet  her  obligations;  if  the  Mexican  Govern- 
ment had  then  chosen  to  take  some  measures  which  the 
American  Resident  considered  unfavourable  to  the  inter- 
ests of  his  employers;  or  if  the  revolutionists  had  tum- 

.  bled  over  the  Government  and  the  Resident  together; 
where,  in  all  probability,  would  the  matter  of  interven- 
tion stand  to-day?  What  is  meant  by  the  American  Gov- 
ernment's promise  to  take  every  possible  step  to  ensure 
the  execution  of  contracts,  if  it  is  not  a  promise  to  use 
force,  when  necessary,  for  the  maintenance  of  that  par- 

•  tial  American  control  of  China  which  must  be  Ameri- 
ca's only  substantial  security  for  loans  to  China?  How 
would  one  demonstrate  to  a  Japanese  patriot  the  dif- 
ference between  a  dominant  financial  interest  so  sup- 
ported, and  an  American  protectorate?  What  answer 
would  one  make  to  the  statement  that  England  and 
France,  secure  in  the  possession  of  their  old  spheres,  and 
in  spite  of  the  opposition  of  Japan,  have  given  America 

[26] 


what  Is  left  of  China  as  her  share  of  the  spoils  of  the 
war? 

But  here  again  the  names  of  nations  do  duty  where 
the  names  of  Governments  and  financial  groups  should 
stand.  Substitute  for  metaphysical  terms  those  which 
correspond  with  the  facts,  and  new  questions  suggest 
themselves;  this  time  for  domestic  application.  Where, 
for  instance,  were  the  anti-Leaguers  when  the  Govern- 
ment and  the  financiers  pledged  the  country  to  this  grand 
adventure  in  one  of  the  most  troublous  regions  on  earth? 
Who  will  provide  for  an  increase  of  American  credit 
facilities,  already  far  short  of  business  needs,  when  more 
millions  have  been  drawn  off  for  use  in  this  new  imperial- 
ist enterprise?  How  can  the  proceeds  of  the  Chinese 
loans  be  as  widely  distributed  as  the  cost  of  armaments, 
and  the  risks  of  war  that  are  involved?  Whose  Con- 
sortium is  this?  Does  it  belong  to  the  people  who  share, 
its  profits,  or  to  the  people  who  bear  its  risks?  And  if 
the  good  folk  of  the  latter  class  could  once  get  their 
hands  on  this  scheme,  how  long  would  it  last? 


[27] 


Pamphlets 


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THE    FREEMAN    PAMPHLETS 

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Hackett,  Francis  (editor).  On  American  Books  (50c). 
HiLLQUiT,  Morris,  Socialism  on  Trial  (50c). 
Hirsch,  Max,  An  Analysis  of  Socialism  (50c). 
Russell,  George  W.  ("iE"),  The  Economics  of  Ireland  (25c). 
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NOV   6   193 

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